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ABSTRACT 
A general dynamical process model of psychiatric disorders is proposed that 
specifies the basic cognitive processes involved in the transition from beliefs 
about self, others and world that are normal and adaptive, to beliefs that are rigid, 
extreme, and maladaptive. The relevant thought trajectories are self-confirming, 
and are considered to underlie the corresponding trajectories in symptoms. In 
contrast with previous work, the model focuses on underlying mechanisms, and it 
provides an evolutionary basis for the widespread susceptibility to psychiatric 
symptoms and disorders without the problematic claim that such disorders were 
selected by evolutionary forces. The model thereby incorporates both normality 
and abnormality in the same framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans are susceptible to a wide variety of mental disorders that, despite their substantial differences, 
are all characterized by distinctive, rigid, extreme beliefs about themselves and others, and 
maladaptive ways of acting in the world. Examples of such beliefs include “I am a failure,” “I am 
incapable of having positive interactions with others,” and “I am overweight and cannot believe those 
who tell me I am dangerously thin.” The maladaptive beliefs associated with psychiatric disorders are 
evident and challenging to anyone who interacts with the individuals on a regular basis, including 
family members and mental health professionals. Yet most people were not born with such peculiar 
beliefs, and their family members can recall times when the client did not have such problematic 
views or any other psychiatric symptoms. How did they come about? 
We propose that they are side-effects of the fact that the web of understandings a human mind 
weaves about the world is not just complex, dynamic, self-organizing (Orsucci, 2002) but also self-
regenerating, self-perpetuating, and thereby ‘alive’, and evolving not just at the biological organismic 
level but at a second, cultural level (Gabora, 1998, 2004, 2008). The ability to weave an internal 
model of the world, or worldview, stems from the specifically human capacity for a self-triggered 
stream of thought, in which one thought triggers another, which triggers another, and so forth; our 
daily experience is formed not just by sensory impressions but also by mental operations on these 
impressions. These mental operations have the desirable effect of structuring impressions into a more-
or-less coherent web of understanding, the integrated nature of which enables us to plan and prioritize, 
draw analogies, adapt behavior to the specifics of situations, and so forth. However, the proclivity to 
mentally operate on impressions also provides for the possibility that they become increasingly 
distorted, particularly if the developing worldview that shapes this assimilation process is becoming a 
biased model of the external world. 
The goal of this chapter is to unpack this argument and propose a tentative, general model of the 
process by which once-normal individuals develop deep, maladaptive convictions that are seemingly 
impervious to refuting evidence and that are closely intertwined with other symptoms. Although the 
contents of beliefs vary across disorders, it is proposed that the basic cognitive processes involved are 
essentially the same across disorders. The model incorporates the possible influences of affective and 
biological factors on the trajectories of belief systems. The focus is on cognition, but there is no claim 
that cognitive factors are always primary or causal. Distinct belief systems are nevertheless almost 
always present in psychiatric disorders, and we are simply proposing a general model of how they 
develop. A proper understanding of how such belief systems develop will presumably be important to 
understanding how rigid belief systems can change for the better. 
The chapter begins with descriptions of the particular beliefs that are commonly involved in a 
variety of Axis I and Axis II disorders from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2000). In the second section, we provide an outline of 
relevant concepts from dynamical systems and complexity theory. Distinctions are made between how 
the present model differs from previous applications of these concepts to psychopathology. We also 
describe research on memory and thought processes, and on interpersonal processes, that are involved 
in the trajectories of belief systems. The fourth section describes the implications of our model and the 
corresponding answers to a number of perennial questions in the literature. 
 
PROTOTYPICAL BELIEFS IN A VARIETY OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 
We begin by outlining the primary beliefs associated with particular disorders (Alloy and Riskind, 
2006; Reinecke and Clark, 2004; Riso, du Toit, Stein, and Young, 2007). Our focus is on the beliefs 
per se and we do not provide full descriptions of the various disorders, which can be found in 
numerous other sources, including the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). We also do not review the research 
on all of the cognitive phenomena associated with each disorder. Instead, we simply summarize 
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prototypical belief constellations. We hope readers will notice the differences and similarities in the 
beliefs across disorders, and the fact that a number of beliefs are associated with each disorder. The 
beliefs also vary greatly in how general versus specific they are. Some pertain to very general thoughts 
about oneself (e.g., “I am a bad person”), whereas others are much more focused and specific (e.g., 
“My heart is racing and I am about to die”). 
Depression	  
Depression typically involves an assortment of unrealistic, negative beliefs that can sometimes be 
delusional (Hollon and DeRubeis, 2004; Derubeis, Young, and Dahlsgaard, 1998). There are beliefs 
about the self (e.g., “I’m worthless”), about past events (e.g., “The breakup with my girlfriend was all 
my fault”), about the future (“I’ll never get another job”), and about the world (“People are 
uncaring”). Automatic negative thoughts in specific situations ("I can't do this") are generated by more 
general and abstract underlying beliefs and assumptions ("I am incompetent and unlovable"). 
Depressive schemas or worldviews are believed to precede and cause depressive episodes. According 
to the hopelessness model of depression (Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy, 1989), vulnerability to 
depression is increased by a depressogenic inferential style. This involves beliefs that negative or 
stressful events are caused by internal, stable, and global factors. The resulting negative expectations 
or hopelessness then generates the other symptoms of depression. Numerous measures of the beliefs 
that commonly occur in depression have been developed (Hollon and DeRubeis, 2004), including a 
measure of the delusional beliefs that occur in psychotic major depression (Meyers et al., 2006). There 
is even a measure of the beliefs that depressed persons tend to have about their depression (Thwaites, 
Dagnon, Huey, and Addis, 2004), which is important because such beliefs affect the perceived 
credibility of treatments and therapy outcomes. 
Mania	  
Inflated self-beliefs (self-esteem, grandiosity) are defining features of mania. Beliefs about one’s 
knowledge, achievements, interpersonal relationships, and abilities are exaggerated, as are perceptions 
of what one can accomplish. Newman and Beck (1992) describe a positive cognitive triad model of 
mania in which the self is seen as highly valued and powerful, experiences are viewed as overly 
positive, and the future is believed to be full of opportunities. Experiences of grandiosity are 
perpetuated by magnification of positive feedback, and minimization of, or obliviousness to, negative 
feedback. On the other hand, mania can also involve paranoid thinking, which is reinforced by 
selective attention to evidence that confirms paranoid beliefs, along with dismissal of disconfirming 
evidence (Derubeis, Young, and Dahlsgaard, 1998). Measures have been developed that assess the 
beliefs that commonly occur in mania and bipolar disorder (Beck, Colis, Steer, Madrak, and Goldberg, 
2006; Mansell, Rigby, Tai, and Lowe, 2008). There is also a recent theory that describes how mood 
swings may be partially caused by the beliefs and interpretations that occur in manic and depressive 
states (Mansell, Morrison, Reid, Lowens, and Tai, 2007). 
Panic	  Disorder	  	  
The primary beliefs in panic attacks involve catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations that 
cause spiraling anxiety and autonomic responses that, in turn, provide further evidence for the 
alarming interpretations (Salkovskis, 1998). Particular bodily sensations are interpreted as signs of 
imminent personal disasters. “I’m having a heart attack”, “I’m dying”, “I am losing my mind.” “I’m 
losing control over my own behavior.” Pre-existing experiences, assumptions, and beliefs about 
anxiety make some patients prone to such expectations for even minor triggering events or situations, 
which culminate in full-blown attacks within seconds. Physiological symptoms generated by minor 
daily stresses or even caffeine can result in being terrified and convinced of the existence of profound 
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threats to their personal safety. Wenzel, Sharp, Brown, Greenberg, and Beck (2006) developed a four-
factor measure of the beliefs that commonly occur in panic disorder. 
Social	  Phobia	  
Social phobia involves both general and specific beliefs about oneself and others (Juster and 
Heimberg, 1998; Ledley, Erwin, and Heimberg, 2008). There are often general beliefs in the necessity 
of being loved and approved by everyone and in being highly competent in many life domains in order 
to be worthwhile. Other people are expected to be critical, and social situations are perceived as 
dangerous and threatening to one’s self-esteem. Social phobics tend to believe that perfect social 
performances are required to avoid social criticisms and that they are unlikely to live up to such high 
standards. These beliefs result in social phobics, “spectatoring,” and routinely monitoring their 
behaviors in the presence of others and others’ evaluations of them. They compare their behavior with 
the high standards that they believe others hold for them. The social environment (e.g., the nonverbal 
behaviors of others) is monitored for signs of threat, and internal experiences of physiological arousal 
are interpreted as signs of failure and looming danger. Public self-consciousness and internal 
distractions increase, and there may be fears of blushing or appearing ridiculous. This sequence of 
events strengthens the negative beliefs that social phobics have about their ability to make positive 
impressions on others. These interpretive tendencies gradually become more powerful and important 
than the actual reactions and feedback from others (e.g., Abbott and Rapee, 2004). Social inhibition 
and withdrawal typically follow. Measures of the beliefs that commonly occur in social phobia include 
those developed by Telch, Lucas, Smits, Powers, Heimberg, and Hart (2004) and by Turner, Johnson, 
Beidel, Heiser, and Lydiard (2003). 
Generalized	  Anxiety	  Disorder	  (GAD)	  
GAD is characterized by excessive and uncontrollable worry about a variety of possible threats. GAD 
individuals constantly search for signs of possible threats in order to cope with or avoid catastrophes 
(Beck and Emery, 1985). While some degree of worry is normal, especially given that human thought 
may have evolved as an adaptive mechanism for anticipating and avoiding dangers, the pervasiveness 
of worry in GAD clients has been perplexing to clinicians. The beliefs about worrying itself can be 
both negative (e.g., “My worrying is uncontrollable and harmful to my health”) and positive beliefs 
(e.g., “Worrying helps me cope”). 
Worry helps individuals avoid processing more painful emotional material, and the cognitive 
processes involved tend to be self-fulfilling. GAD clients display a pre-attentive, or even unconscious 
bias to threat cues. They display rapid cognitive avoidance of detected threats, which impairs explicit 
memory while simultaneously improving implicit memory for the material. They also make negative 
interpretations and predictions from ambiguous and neutral information. Aversive images are avoided 
in the short term, but anxious interpretations and beliefs are maintained because corrective 
information is not properly processed. Worrying thus increases cognitive rigidity (Borkovec and 
Newman, 1998). Wells (2006) developed a three-dimensional belief-based measure of worry that 
differentiates GAD patients from patients with other anxiety disorders. 
Obsessive-­‐Compulsive	  Disorder	  (OCD)	  
A surprisingly wide variety of maladaptive beliefs have been found to occur in OCD, including 
overestimation of threat and risk, exaggerated responsibility and guilt, beliefs about the need to 
control thoughts, beliefs about close links between thoughts and actions, perfectionism, and 
uncertainty and doubt (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997; Wilhelm and 
Steketee, 2006). Intrusive thoughts are given excessive importance, and there is an exaggerated sense 
of responsibility for ominous harm coming to self or others. Individuals with OCD also tend to believe 
that they have the power necessary to prevent negative outcomes. 
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Some maladaptive beliefs in OCD appear to stem from other maladaptive beliefs. For example, 
there tend to be: (a) beliefs about the need for perfect competence in order to feel worthwhile; (b) the 
belief that mistakes or falling short of one’s ideals should result in punishment; (c) the belief that one 
has the power to prevent negative outcomes by performing special rituals; and (d) beliefs that certain 
thoughts and feelings are unacceptable, potentially catastrophic, and worthy of punishment. These 
beliefs all contribute to excessively high expectations of threat and aversive outcomes. Similarly, the 
belief that every situation has a perfect solution and that such perfect solutions must be found results 
in chronic indecisiveness, discomfort, and doubts about one’s experiences and actions. Ritualistic 
behaviors are then performed to reduce aversive uncertainties. 
Maladaptive beliefs also contribute to the intrusive thoughts commonly experienced by OCD 
patients. Intrusive thoughts are experienced by over 90% of the general population, and they are 
typically ignored. But they are given excessive importance, attention, and faulty interpretations by 
those with OCD (Salkovskis, 1989), who tend to believe that simply having an unwanted or 
objectionable thought is morally equivalent to engaging in the corresponding objectionable behavior 
(Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran, and Woody, 1995). This “thought-action fusion” contributes to the 
belief that the imagined negative events are more likely to actually occur. OCD individuals then make 
efforts to suppress such thoughts, which results in further sensitization and vigilance to all thoughts, 
causing the cycle of attention to intrusions and attempts at suppression to escalate. OCD individuals 
eventually believe they must exert complete control over their intrusive thoughts and impulses 
(Steketee and Frost, 1998). A three-factor measure of the beliefs that commonly occur in OCD was 
described by Steketee (2005). 
Post-­‐Traumatic	  Stress	  Disorder	  (PTSD)	  
The beliefs of people with PTSD involve themes of danger, guilt, shame, alienation, mistrust, betrayal, 
disillusionment with authority, loss of personal control, and beliefs in one’s inability to cope with 
stressful events (Dalgleish, 2004). The traumatic experiences are realities that cannot be assimilated 
with existing, normal, preferred beliefs, such as assumptions that people are benevolent, that the world 
is meaningful, and that oneself is worthy and valuable. The contents of beliefs systems in PTSD vary 
depending on the kinds of traumas experienced, and a number of measures have been developed to 
identify the dysfunctional thoughts and distortions that can occur in PTSD cases (Taylor, 2004). 
Eating	  Disorders	  
Individuals with anorexia nervosa continually believe that they are too fat and their desire to lose 
weight dominates their thoughts and lives. Neither the idea of being too fat nor the fear of gaining 
weight disappear as the person loses weight. Instead, the belief that one is fat becomes stronger. The 
person also typically denies the seriousness of the loss of weight. These beliefs are so rigid that 
experts believe that anorexic patient must have distorted perceptions of their bodies (Fairburn, 2008). 
Patients with bulimia nervosa also believe they are heavy, slow, and fat, and they have 
dysfunctional thoughts about food and eating. Foods are either “good” or “bad”. This strict, 
dichotomous thinking style increases the probability that rules for foods and eating will be broken. 
Consumption of even a small amount of forbidden food results in the belief that one’s diet is "totally 
broken”. Further dysfunctional automatic thoughts follow (e.g., “since my day is already ruined, I 
might as well continue to eat”). Thus, a minor dietary transgression may culminate in a binge episode. 
Those with eating disorders place excessive importance on outward appearance and weight in 
their general self-evaluations. They believe that to be fat is to be worthless, unlikable, and disgusting, 
and that to be attractive, successful, intelligent, and to be happy it is necessary to be skinny. These 
beliefs are baffling because the patients are typically not objectively overweight (Fairburn, 2008; 
Jansen, 1998). Eating disorder patients commonly trace their negative self-beliefs to trauma or abuse 
in childhood and they tend to believe that dieting is an effective method of counteracting the negative 
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implications associated with their self-beliefs (Cooper, Todd, and Wells, 1998). Measures of the 
beliefs that are common among patients with eating disorders were provided by Hinrichsen , Garry, 
and Waller (2006) and by Young, Klosko, and Weishaar (2003). 
Schizophrenia	  
There is an extensive literature on a variety of cognitive impairments that occur in schizophrenia. The 
present focus will not be on the long list of such impairments but on the beliefs that schizophrenics 
typically have about themselves and others. Perhaps most obvious are delusions. Beck and Rector 
(2005) describe how delusional belief systems emerge from biased information processing. Particular 
schemas become hypersalient, rigid, relatively impermeable to ordinary corrective feedback, and 
shape perceptions of the world to the exclusion of consensually shared meanings. The end results are 
firm but clearly false beliefs that someone or something controls their thoughts or plots against them, 
or that they have special relationships with God. Beck (2004) described how negative beliefs about 
interpersonal attachments and about one's abilities in schizophrenia provide a basis for persecutory 
delusions and for negative symptoms. He also described how delusions of grandiosity develop from 
feelings of loneliness, inferiority, and vulnerability. Measures of the beliefs that sometimes occur in 
schizophrenia were described by Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, and Warman (2004), Csipke and 
Kinderman (2006), and by Eisen, Phillips, Baer, Beer, Atala, and Rasmussen (1998). 
Especially relevant to the present chapter are other, non delusional beliefs that are less dramatic, 
less widely known, but which are also commonly held by schizophrenics. These beliefs have been 
uncovered in studies of the phenomenology of schizophrenia, i.e., from first-person accounts from 
schizophrenics (Davidson, Stayner, and Haglund, 1998). One common finding is that even 
schizophrenics who are withdrawn and apparently indifferent to others describe themselves as being 
intensely lonely and haunted by the beliefs that they are “nothing” and that they will never have 
positive, affectionate relationships with others. They commonly believe that will not be accepted or 
welcomed into regular social groups and communities and that they are not full, regular members of 
the human race. They often believe that others see them as mental patients and not as full human 
beings with unique personalities and sensitivities. They believe that they will not be taken seriously 
when they talk. They believe that they are excessively sensitive to stimulation and cues during 
interpersonal encounters and live in fear that they will be overwhelmed and unable to respond. They 
believe that they will be unable to cope with even minor signs of negative affect or disapproval from 
others, and that they are unable to manage the demands and complexities of relationships. They often 
believe they have lost their identities, and that they will never be able to properly control their 
thoughts and behaviors. 
Personality	  Disorders	  	  
Personality is typically defined as stable patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors that persist across 
time and situations. To a large degree, our personalities are defined by our stable beliefs, assumptions, 
and automatic thoughts about ourselves and others. In the DSM-IV-TR, personality disorders (PDs) 
are described as rigid, extreme, and maladaptive constellations of otherwise normal personality traits. 
It therefore directly follows that there will be prototypical sets of beliefs associated with each of the 
ten official PDs (Davidson, 2008). The most thorough elucidation of the beliefs associated with 
particular PDs was provided by Beck, Freeman, and Associates (1990) and by Beck, Freeman, Davis, 
and Associates (2004). The lists of beliefs for each PD are rather long and so the beliefs associated 
with just two PDs will be provided here. Common beliefs in the narcissistic PD include: “I am a very 
special person;” “Since I am so superior, I am entitled to special treatment and privileges;” “I don’t 
have to be bound by the rules that apply to other people;” “It is very important to get recognition, 
praise, and admiration;” “If others don’t respect my status, they should be punished;” “Other people 
should satisfy my needs;” “Other people should recognize how special I am;” “It is intolerable if I am 
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not treated with respect or do not get what I am entitled to;” “Other people do not deserve the 
admiration or riches that they get;” “People have no right to criticize me;” “No one’s needs should 
interfere with my own;” “Since I am so talented, people should go out of their way to promote my 
career;” “Only people as brilliant as I am understand me,” and “I have every reason to expect grand 
things" (Beck et al., 1990, pp. 361-362). 
Common beliefs in the antisocial PD include: “I have to look out for myself;” “Force or cunning 
is the best way to get things done;” “We live in a jungle and the strong person is the one who 
survives;” “People will get at me if I do not get them first;” “It is not important to keep promises or 
honor debts;” “Lying and cheating are OK as long as you don’t get caught;” “I have been unfairly 
treated and am entitled to get my fair share by whatever means I can;” “Other people are weak and 
deserve to be taken;” “If I don’t push other people, I will get pushed around;” “I should do whatever I 
can get away with;” “What others think of me doesn’t really matter;” “If I want something, I should 
do whatever is necessary to get it;” “I can get away with things so I don’t need to worry about bad 
consequences;” “If people can’t take care of themselves, that’s their problem” (Beck et al., 1990, p. 
361). Lists of common beliefs involved in the paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal, avoidant, dependent, 
histrionic, borderline, and obsessive-compulsive PDs were also provided by Beck et al. (1990, 2004). 
 
DYNAMICS OF NORMAL AND PATHOLOGICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS 
We believe that a dynamical, complex systems approach can provide a general model that 
encompasses the transition from a normal set of beliefs to worldviews that typify various pathologies. 
There has been much previous interest in dynamical models of mental states, including those 
associated with psychopathology (Mandell and Selz, 1995; Tschacher and Kupper, 2007). Examples 
include work on depression (Heiby et al., 2003), bipolar disorder (Gottschalk et al., 1995), post-
traumatic stress (Horowitz, 1986), alcohol abuse (Hufford et al., 2003), schizophrenia (Paulus et al., 
1996), and antisocial behavior in children and adolescents (Granic and Patterson, 2006). This previous 
research has focused on nonlinear, dynamical trends in diverse constellations of symptoms with 
particular focus on variations in the severity of symptoms across time. This work is certainly valuable, 
but we believe it is also important to focus on the development of maladaptive belief systems. A 
proper understanding of the dynamical patterns that underlie the cognitive domain of human 
functioning may prove useful in understanding the dynamical patterns that also exist in the symptoms 
that have been the focus of previous work.  
The	  Forging	  of	  a	  Worldview	  
We use the term ‘worldview’ to refer to one’s internal model of the world. We want to clarify that by 
this term we mean much more than a collection of isolated memories, beliefs, attitudes, bits of 
knowledge, and so forth. The concept of a worldview encompasses the manner in which one navigates 
memories and bits of knowledge, weaving narratives with them, and thereby understanding and 
interacting with the world. We noted that a worldview is self-regenerating, or autopoietic, meaning 
that through the interactions amongst its parts it forges its structure as a whole. We also noted that it 
has been proposed that a worldview constitutes the fundamental structural unit of cultural evolution 
akin to the organism in biological evolution (Gabora, 1998, 2004, 2008). It changes through self-
triggered thought as well as individual and social learning, and cultural evolution occurs when the 
structure of one worldview crystallizes, in whole or in part, in the mind of another individual. 
The worldview of a normal adult is integrated as evidenced by our ability to prioritize activities of 
different sorts, combine information from different domains (as in analogical reasoning), adapt views 
and actions to new circumstances, frame new experiences in terms of previous ones, solve problems 
using peripheral cues, and formulate plans of action that reflect the specifics of a situation. Some of 
the contents of a worldview are acquired through social learning, e.g. imitation, social facilitation, and 
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so forth. Most other worldview contents are clumped together as the product of individual learning. 
This includes items obtained through perceptual processes as well as those obtained through 
contemplation or learning processes that are not socially mediated. We can also distinguish between 
elements of the worldview that are assimilated more or less ‘as is’, and elements that undergo 
extensive modification in an attempt to frame it in one’s own terms, adapt it to the unique structure of 
one’s beliefs, or ‘put one’s own spin on it’ (Gabora, under revision).  
The	  Worldview	  as	  Self-­‐organizing	  and	  Self-­‐mending	  
A worldview is able to obtain and maintain this integrated structure because it exhibits a natural 
tendency for self-organization. It finds structure spontaneously through interactions amongst its parts. 
Narrative structures such as scripts and stories emerging from sequences of experiences, and attitudes 
emerging from specific beliefs, and these structures being in dynamic flux over time. Previous states 
influence present states, which influence future states. Internal feedback mechanisms, in combination 
with external influences, encourage dynamics within beliefs systems. 
A worldview is self-mending in the sense that one is inclined to resolve threats to its congruity or 
integrity (Gabora, 1999; Heider, 1958; Greenwald et al., 2002; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; 
Piaget, 1970). Much as a wounded organism may spontaneously heal, if we encounter something that 
challenges our knowledge and beliefs (e.g. a script plays out in an unexpected way, someone does 
something out of character, or an experimental result is different from what was predicted by theory), 
we experience cognitive dissonance and spontaneously attempt to weave a story, fortify our 
knowledge, or revise our beliefs to accommodate the challenge (Festinger, 1957). 
A worldview is additionally self-regenerating in the sense that an adult shares concepts, ideas, 
attitudes, stories, and experiences with children (and other adults), influencing little by little the 
formation of other worldviews. Each worldview takes shape through the influence of many others, 
though some, such as those of parents and teachers, will predominate. The children expose fragments 
of what was originally the adult’s worldview to different experiences, different bodily constraints, and 
thus sculpt unique internal models of the relation of self to world. One can also say that a worldview is 
autopoietic because the whole is reconstituted through the interactions of the parts (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980). One memory can evoke another, which evokes another, and so forth, and each time a 
memory is evoked it can be expressed, and thereby influence other worldviews. 
Cognitive	  Flexibility	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  Associative	  Memory	  
In order to see how the proclivity for self-triggered thought emerges, we look briefly to the structure 
of associative memory. We take as a starting point some fairly well established characteristics of 
memory. Human memories are encoded in neurons that are sensitive to ranges (or values) of 
subsymbolic microfeatures (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992; Smolensky, 1988). For example, one 
might respond to a particular shade of red, or the quality of being shrewd, or quite likely, something 
that does not exactly match an established term (Mikkulainen, 1997). Although each neuron responds 
maximally to a particular microfeature, it responds to a lesser extent to related microfeatures, an 
organization referred to as coarse coding. Not only does a given neuron participate in the encoding of 
many memories, but each memory is encoded in many neurons. For example, neuron A may respond 
preferentially to lines of a certain angle (say 90 degrees), while its neighbor B responds preferentially 
to lines of a slightly different angle (say 91 degrees), and so forth. However, although A responds 
maximally to lines of 90 degrees, it responds somewhat to lines of 91 degrees. The upshot is that 
storage of an item is distributed across a cell assembly that contains many neurons, and likewise, each 
neuron participates in the storage of many items (Hinton, McClelland, and Rumelhart, 1986). Thus, 
the same neurons get used and re-used in different capacities, a phenomenon referred to as neural re-
entrance (Edelman, 1987). Items stored in overlapping regions are correlated, or share features. 
Memory is said to be content addressable; there is a systematic relationship between the state of an 
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input and the place it gets encoded. As a result, episodes stored in memory can thereafter be evoked 
by stimuli that are similar or ‘resonant’ in some (perhaps context-specific) way (Hebb, 1949; Marr, 
1969). 
The fact that memory is distributed and content-addressable is critically important to cognitive 
flexibility and the ability to escape rigid patterns. If it were not distributed, there would be no overlap 
between items that share sub-symbolic microfeatures, and thus no means of forging an association 
between them. If it were not content-addressable, associations would not be meaningful. Content 
addressability is why the entire memory does not have to be searched or randomly sampled; it ensures 
that one naturally retrieves items that are relevant. Content addressability also facilitates the activation 
of one item by another that is related to it in a rarely noticed but useful or appealing way. Recall that if 
the regions in memory where two distributed representations are encoded overlap, then they share one 
or more microfeatures. They may have been encoded at different times, under different circumstances, 
and the correlation between them never explicitly noticed. But the fact that their distributions overlap 
means that some context could come along for which this overlap would be relevant or useful, and 
cause one to evoke the other. Content addressability also means that there are as many routes to a 
reminding event as there are microfeatures by which they overlap; i.e. there is plenty of room for 
typical as well as atypical associations. It is because the region of activated memory locations falls 
midway between the two extremes—not distributed and fully distributed—that one can generate a 
stream of coherent yet potentially creative thought (Gabora, 2002). The more detail with which items 
have been encoded in memory, the greater their potential overlap with other items, and the more 
retrieval routes for creatively forging relationships between what is currently experienced and what 
has been experienced in the past, and thereby ‘breaking out of a rut’. 
Navigating	  the	  ‘Realm	  of	  Potentiality’	  
We get ideas, make decisions, and plan courses of action, keeping an eye to what we expect and want 
from the future. Surrounding all present situations and events there can be said to be a ‘halo’ of 
possible future events, possible ways in which the present will unfold into the future. This can be 
referred to as the ‘realm of potentiality’ (Gabora and Aerts, 2005, 2007) or ‘adjacent possible’ 
(Kauffman, 2008). When one’s conception of what is possible in the short term and long term is 
broad, and one is able to envision a multitude of ways in which a situation could unfold, we say that 
the situation is in a potentiality state with respect to the state of the worldview. When one’s 
conception of the adjacent possible ‘shrivels’ and one’s worldview no longer provides new ways of 
envisioning how a situation could unfold, we say that the situation is in an eigenstate with respect to 
the state of the worldview. 
A narrowing over time of one’s conception of what is immediately possible is natural and perhaps 
in some respects adaptive; there is no need to prepare oneself for the vast number of ways a situation 
could unfold if it almost always unfolds in a certain predictable way. However, a narrowing in one’s 
conception of the adjacent possible surrounding the event can be associated with a belief structure that 
causes one to act in ways that reinforce particular trajectories and contribute to cognitive and 
behavioral rigidity. 
The	  Crystalization	  of	  Distorted	  Belief	  Structures	  
The solidifying of a structure of beliefs is in many respects useful, for it automates and thus decreases 
effort needed for habitual acts. The solidification process makes use of the distributed, content-
addressable, coarse-coded nature of memory, and the capacity for associative recall. Daily situations 
evoke responses, including all one’s current thoughts and feelings about a situation, and particular 
regions of memory are activated. Items previously encoded to neurons activated by a situation provide 
‘ingredients’ for the next thought. This next thought is slightly different from the one that preceded it, 
so it activates and retrieves from a slightly different region, and so forth. The interaction between the 
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developing belief structure and the worldview in turn alters the worldview, actualizes some aspect of 
it that was before merely potential, and changes what is subsequently potential for it, i.e. how it will 
proceed from there to generate contexts. In this way, the belief structure is reiteratively reinterpreted 
or redescribed (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) from various real or imagined perspectives or internally-
generated contexts. 
By internally generating contexts for the belief structure, elements external to the current subject 
of thought leak into one’s conception of it. Eventually, a belief structure can be said to be in an 
eigenstate with respect to context provided by the worldview, i.e. no longer subject to change. The 
worldview does not continue to provide new contexts because the problem and worldview are no 
longer dissonant. The belief reached a state where it is consistent with the worldview, and the 
worldview has reached a state where it can incorporate the belief. Of course, if the worldview that 
guides this assimilation process is biased, the mental operations that transform the belief will distort it 
in such a manner as to strengthen and perpetuate the misguided worldview.  
What causes impressions to organize themselves into a mental model of reality that is distorted? 
Belief systems, perhaps especially those associated with psychopathology, likely have two kinds of 
external input: (a) from the social and physical environments, and (b) from affective and biological 
factors within the person that are nevertheless external to the belief systems themselves. Specific 
beliefs are likely not continuously present in consciousness, but there are probably reliable patterns of 
temporal variation in maladaptive beliefs within each person. Furthermore, once an individual 
embarks on a train of thought, the direction and conclusions of the trains may become rigidly 
consistent and rapid over time. Attractors cause trains of thought with initially varying starting points 
to result in the same, repeating end states. It is also assumed that slight changes in internal or external 
control factors may cause dramatic changes in system dynamics and behavior. 
Interpersonal	  Processes	  in	  the	  Solidification	  of	  Belief	  Structures	  
Cognitive and interpersonal processes are presumably closely intertwined as belief systems develop. 
Emerging beliefs about oneself and the world are initially experienced as tentative working 
hypotheses that require further investigation and confirmation. Yet the very methods that individuals 
naturally use to test their suspicions are known to be biased in ways that create and produce 
confirming evidence (Andrews, 1989; Carson, 1982; Snyder, 1984; Swann, Rentfrow, and Guinn, 
2003). Beliefs have a tendency to constrict the range of possible behaviors in a situation. The 
behaviors that are emitted on the basis of particular beliefs then, in turn, naturally constrain or restrict 
the range of possible responses from others. The responses provided by others then tend to confirm the 
original beliefs that generated and skewed the whole process. If I think that I am a likeable person and 
that you are friendly, then I am likely to display friendly behaviors towards you that will prompt 
friendly responses from you. Your friendly responses will then serve to confirm my original hunches 
about your friendliness. Developing beliefs thus rapidly become solidified via the self-fulfilling 
prophecies that are involved in how beliefs are tested. The course of events is taken as evidence for 
the correctness of the original beliefs, which typically occurs without the realization of how the course 
of events was skewed by the original beliefs. 
There is evidence that individuals engage in such self-fulfilling prophecies with imagined others 
(Andrews, 1989), perhaps especially once beliefs begin to solidify. As imagined or anticipated 
interpersonal scenarios become scripted, expectations about interactions become stronger, which 
further constricts how interactions unfold. A variety of well-established cognitive self-fulfilling 
processes can occur either on their own, or simultaneously with interpersonal processes, that further 
solidify the developing belief system. These include selective attention, selective interpretation, and 
selective recall (Mathews and Macleod, 2005; Swann et al., 2002). 
Self-concepts and worldviews eventually solidify as a result of these cognitive and interpersonal 
processes. Indeed, one’s personality is largely defined by one’s recurring patterns of beliefs and by the 
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behaviors and affective reactions that are generated by one’s beliefs. Personality becomes difficult to 
change because belief systems and worldviews are naturally self-confirming. The flexibility and wide 
range of ‘adjacent possibles’ that existed before beliefs systems developed are gradually reduced. 
Individuals who are well-adjusted tend to have beliefs and behaviors that are more flexible than those 
of individuals who are less well-adjusted. But presumably anyone’s range of thoughts and behaviors 
may be narrower and more maladaptive than they realize. Individuals are more likely to be happy and 
well-adjusted if they retain some flexibility and if their particular patterns of rigidity in thought and 
behavior do not produce aversive outcomes for themselves and others. Unfortunately, this is not 
always the case. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF OUR MODEL AND ANSWERS TO PERENNIAL QUESTIONS 
The above descriptions of the nature of beliefs systems and worldviews, of the nature of memory, of 
how one idea leads to another, and of how belief systems solidify, are all useful in explaining the basic 
phenomenon that is the focus of this chapter: How once-normal individuals develop deep, maladaptive 
convictions that are seemingly impervious to refuting evidence, and that are closely intertwined with 
psychiatric symptoms. The maladaptive beliefs that are associated with disorders are not present at 
birth. They are, instead, discovered and developed through basic, normal, universal, cognitive 
processes. We have brains that naturally weave and organize coherent beliefs systems from the wide 
array of everyday information inputs. Our brains are naturally drawn to inconsistencies in our belief 
systems and we attempt to resolve them. When our memories are searched during these self-mending 
efforts, our brains provide us with familiar bits of information that, at least initially, we can weave and 
piece together in novel, creative (for us) ways. 
As our various beliefs become more idiosyncratically integrated and coherent, they are 
increasingly experienced as correct and real. Our very efforts to test the veracity of our beliefs tend to 
provide further confirming information. The range of alternative beliefs about ourselves and others 
shrivels. We slowly seal ourselves into self-made corners that seem absolutely real and true. Other 
people may seem foolish for not sharing our views. The entire trajectories in the development of belief 
systems are dynamic and complex. The primary differences between those with and without 
psychiatric problems in this view, are in the contents and rigidity of the belief systems, and not the 
basic processes. 
Maladaptive	  Creativity	  
It could be said that the sets of maladaptive beliefs in the disorders described above are the products of 
creative minds. Creativity is required to fashion the coherent, integrated networks of beliefs from 
initially disconnected elements and experiences. Once these networks are in place, they become so 
automatically and routinely activated that the range of adjacent possibles is severely limited. Thought 
patterns become more clearly rigid. At this point, our natural, creative, self-mending and integrative 
tendencies still exist, but they may begin to work against us. Our brains now creatively twist what 
should be dissonant information into confirming information. “I clearly see that I really am fat, even 
though these people have hospitalized me for being too thin.” 
The	  Pervasiveness	  of	  Disorders	  
Our natural capacities for developing mental models of reality and for problem-solving leave us with 
the potential to develop maladaptive beliefs systems. This provides a partial answer to a vexing, 
perennial problem: Why are psychological disorders so pervasive and persistent? It is difficult to 
argue that so many forms of maladaptation were specifically selected by evolutionary forces. 
Neurological defects should not be common and should not persist through generations. (The 
psychopathic exploitation of others may be an exception.) Instead, what is likely inherited are not 
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defects, but the basic architecture for problem-solving and for fashioning coherent mental models of 
the world. 
The end results of our integrating, self-mending thoughts may sometimes be distinctly 
maladaptive, but the ability to process a truly wide range of possible inputs and to generate creative 
integrations and solutions was likely a central reason why the capacity for self-triggered thought, and 
thereby an integrated worldview, evolved. The same brain capacities that lead us to create novel 
technologies and artwork can also lead us seriously astray. Normality and abnormality can thus be 
seen as belonging in the same cognitive framework. 
Sources	  of	  Belief	  Contents	  
If the primary differences between individuals with and without psychiatric problems are in the 
contents of their beliefs systems, and not the basic processes that generated the beliefs, then it is 
important to consider where the peculiar contents come from. We have described how maladaptive 
beliefs can be fashioned from diverse inputs, and there must certainly be differences between normal 
and abnormal people with regards to the nature of the inputs. There appear to be two broad, 
interrelated categories. First, the family, peer, and community experiences are known to be quite 
different for those with and without problems. Real-world risk factors result in distinct inputs and 
basic beliefs about oneself and others.  
A second, related important source of input is one’s own affective and physiological states. 
Energy levels, brain chemistry, and how one’s body feels undoubtedly influence the thoughts one has 
about oneself and others. When the input from internal states is consistent over time, our brains must 
weave this input into a network with other inputs.  
On subsequent occasions, when physiological states may be more positive than is usually the 
case, individuals may be led us back to chronic darker views because of the mountains of evidence 
and the network of automatic assumptions that have become so available and entrenched. 
Self-­‐Defeating	  and	  Persistent	  Beliefs	  
We can also speculate as to why beliefs systems sometimes become abnormally rigid and resistant to 
change, even when they are self-defeating and continually produce negative outcomes. Our above 
descriptions of how and why worldviews tend to solidify at least partially explains the common, 
normal levels of rigidity in belief systems. We suspect that excessive rigidity develops from the 
cognitive processes that are used to test the veracity of beliefs, especially when individuals are 
threatened or stressed. When beliefs are questioned and doubts begin to arise, perhaps as a result of 
disconfirming feedback from others, individuals search the current situation and their memories in an 
effort to determine what is real and true. But when it is the experience of negative affect that initiates 
this process, then individuals may be particularly likely fall back and activate their existing belief 
networks. When threatened, it is easier and more comforting to find evidence for what one already 
knows and believes than to seriously question existing assumptions, and entertain the possibility that 
reality is dramatically different from what has long been assumed to be the case. Strong pulls may be 
exerted on others to provide reactions and feedback that confirms one’s threatened but preferred views 
(Andrews, 1989; Kiesler, 1996). As individuals repeatedly pursue these methods of mending 
inconsistencies in their belief networks, confirming what they already know may become their sole 
source of comfort and reassurance. What people conclude each time their beliefs networks are 
activated and then confirmed may be grim and ultimately self-defeating, but it is also very familiar, 
real, and reassuring (Andrews, 1989; Swann et al., 2003). The ‘adjacent possibles‘ for more adaptive 
beliefs are increasingly limited and the change that would be required is too great and discomforting. 
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Inconsistent	  Beliefs	  
Gaps and inconsistencies in beliefs systems generate negative affect and self-mending cognitive 
activity. Dissonance reduction efforts are often but not always successful. Un-resolvable conflicts 
between beliefs may result in aversive symptoms, such as those in post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). 
In other words, while anxiety and negative affect may be generated by beliefs about specific 
threats, as in phobias, they can also be generated by conflicts between networks of beliefs that are 
frequently activated but that result in dramatically different and incompatible conclusions about the 
nature of reality.It is also important to note that some disorders, such as bipolar disorder and the 
borderline personality disorder, are characterized by alternation between dramatically different 
psychological states. Those with such disorders presumably have rich, frequently activated networks 
of beliefs for each of the states that they are prone to. 
Borderline patients are sometimes deeply loving, accepting, and appreciative of close others. But 
other times their distrust, anger, and rage at the same close others can be powerful and highly 
destructive. It is as if they have two strongly contrasting sets of internal working models of themselves 
and others, and both sets are experienced as absolutely real. In these cases, both the actual states and 
the shifts between states are problematic for themselves and others. 
Diagnostic	  Comorbidity	  and	  Disorder	  Prototypes	  
A final feature of our model is that it provides a partial explanation for the often high levels of 
diagnostic comorbidity and for the many patients who seem to have blends of disorders and yet who 
are not highly prototypical of any single disorder. It seems only natural that some of the same 
maladaptive beliefs will be evident in different disorders. The beliefs associated with schizophrenia 
likely encourage the development of beliefs that are also seen in depression. The networks of beliefs 
in schizophrenia and depression are adjacent possibles. The result is individuals who may meet the 
criteria for both disorders. The same applies to other forms of comorbidity. Also relevant are patients 
who are clearly disordered but who do not meet the criteria for specific disorders. An example is that 
fact that “Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified” is the mostly commonly diagnosed PD in 
clinical settings. This likely occurs because belief systems are not required to develop in conformity 
with particular templates. Instead, creative, organizing, and integrative cognition is applied to varying 
inputs and experiences, which can result in highly idiosyncratic belief systems, some of which are 
maladaptively rigid and extreme. 
Causal	  Influences	  and	  Possibilities	  for	  Change	  
In this chapter we have described the dynamics of beliefs processes that we suspect occur in a variety 
of disorders. Our model is descriptive. Causal associations between beliefs and disorders presumably 
sometimes exist and operate in both directions. The associations may take at least three different 
forms (Klein, Wonderlich, and Shea, 1993). First, rigid belief systems may operate as a predisposing 
or vulnerability factor for psychopathology, and psychopathology may operate as a predisposing or 
vulnerability factor for rigid beliefs. In the latter case, abnormal affective and physiological states 
generate cognitive inputs that becomes integrated with other input into coherent belief systems. 
Second, even when beliefs do not play a predisposing or causal role in disorders, they may affect the 
course or expression of disorders (the "pathoplasty" model). Thoughts about oneself and others can 
result in affective states, behaviors, and interpersonal experiences that can modify the course of a 
disorder. Similarly, the existence of a disorder may alter the development of belief systems. 
Individuals discover new information about themselves as a result of having a disorder. A third 
possibility is the complication or scar hypothesis. In this case, belief systems may be fundamentally 
altered in enduring ways by the experience of a disorder and the effects may persist once the disorder 
itself disappears. In summary, beliefs may sometimes play a causal role in disorders, and they are also 
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influenced by disorders. The directions of influence probably vary across both individuals and 
disorders. 
Regardless of the origins of rigid beliefs systems, once they exist, they are likely problematic for 
the individual and for those with whom the individual interacts. The rich, readily activated networks 
of available thoughts can make the individual very certain, stubborn, and exasperating to be with, 
particularly when their beliefs are ultimately self-defeating. A belief network that has become highly 
woven, integrated, and repeatedly activated does not suddenly disappear, even when other symptoms 
begin to fade. Rigid maladaptive belief systems likely fade only slowly, and only when the individual 
fashions alternative belief networks that are frequently activated and that seem more convincingly real 
than the pre-existing beliefs. Relapses may be common as individuals tentatively shift their mental 
models of reality. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we presented a general dynamical process model of belief systems in psychiatric 
disorders. It is proposed that for a broad range of different disorders the basic underlying cognitive 
processes involved in the transition from beliefs are normal and adaptive to beliefs that are rigid, 
extreme, and maladaptive are of a similar nature. We further propose that they are all side-effects of 
the fact that the web of understandings a human mind weaves about the world is not just complex, 
dynamic, self-organizing, but also self-regenerating, self-perpetuating, and thereby alive and evolving 
not just at the biological organismic level but at a second, cultural level. The ability to weave an 
internal model of the world, or worldview, stems from the specifically human capacity for self-
triggered stream of thought, in which one thought triggers another, which triggers another, and so 
forth. Self-triggered thought enables our original or raw impressions of the world to be assimilated 
into a growing, ever-changing mental model of reality, or worldview. In so doing we weave a more-
or-less coherent web of understanding, which makes the human mind particularly adept at planning 
and prioritizing, drawing analogies, adapting behavior to the specifics of situations, and so forth. 
However, this transformation process can also cause impressions to become increasingly distorted. 
The more distorted the developing worldview, the greater the extent to which newly forming 
impressions and beliefs become distorted as they are made sense of by this worldview. The relevant 
thought trajectories are self-confirming, and are considered to underlie the corresponding trajectories 
in symptoms. In contrast with previous work, the model proposed here focuses on underlying 
mechanisms and it provides an evolutionary basis for the widespread susceptibility to psychiatric 
symptoms and disorders without the problematic claim that such disorders were selected by 
evolutionary forces. The model thereby incorporates both normality and abnormality in the same 
framework. 
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